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The Depression in Sweden and the United States A Comparison of causes and policies
The depression of the 1930s was a worldwide phenomenon. The economic activity of practically every country was strongly influenced by the depression. This was the case for a small open economy like the Swedish one as well as for a large and fairly closed economy like the American. The character of the depression, however -particularly its duration and its severity -differed significantly from one country to another. Generally, countries that had left the gold standard at an early stage of the depression experienced a less pronounced decline in prices and output than those that remained on gold.
There has been considerable discussion among American economists about the causal interpretation of the American depression. Two general classes of alternative explanations have been proposed. The first one, the money hypothesis, stems in its modern version from the work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and suggests that monetary developments played a key role during the depression. The second one, the spending hypothesis, which has recently been advocated by Peter Temin (1976) , states that changes in autonomous spending caused the contraction. The present discussion about the causes of the depression is to a large extent based on the work of these economists, although both classes of explanations have been advanced earlier within as well as outside of the United States. 1 The purpose of this paper is to compare the depression of the 1930s in Sweden and in the United States by focusing on (1) the causes of the start and development of the depression and (2) the impact of macroeconomic policies in the two countries. The aim of this comparative analysis is to discriminate between the money hypothesis and the spending hypothesis on the basis of the evidence from Sweden. When examining the 1930s, American economists have generally regarded the American record as the bench-mark case. Instead, the Swedish record will be adopted here as the basis for comparison. For the following reasons Sweden provides an interesting comparison with the United States, one that is highly suitable for examining the American depression:
1. Monetary and fiscal policies were applied in Sweden in a countercyclical manner. Two unique experiments in economic policy were carried out. First, a monetary program of price stabilization based on Knut Wicksell's recommendations was adopted after Sweden had left the gold standard in 1931. Second, and better known of less actual impact, a deliberate countercyclical fiscal policy -inspired by the work of Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, and others -was initiated in 1933. In the United States neither fiscal nor monetary policy was applied on any significant scale to counteract the contractionary forces. Rather, the behavior of the Federal Reserve System has been assigned a crucial role in the explanation of the development of the American depression.
2. In Sweden, a small open economy, the depression was primarily "imported'' through the foreign sector, while the depression in the United States generally is regarded as having been generated domestically.
3. In Sweden the economic profession exerted a significant influence on the framing of economic policy. Economists often had direct contact with the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, and the Department of Finance throughout the 1930s. 4. Reliable data on monetary and real developments are available from both countries. The minutes from the board meetings of the Riksbank in the 1930s have also been made available recently, allowing for an inside examination of its policy.1
----------------
This article is organized in the following way. First, the statistical picture is presented, displaying the behavior of several economic variables such as income, output, prices, and various monetary aggregates. Second, the Swedish experience of the 1930s is considered.
Here the policy of the Riksbank is assigned great importance, for two reasons: (1) there are significant differences in the behavior of monetary aggregates and in the policy of the Riksbank and the Federal Reserve System; and (2) fiscal policy had a relatively minor impact in both countries. Third, the American record is discussed from the viewpoint of the money hypothesis and the spending hypothesis. A number of comparisons are made with the Swedish experience in order to examine the explanatory power of these two hypotheses. Fourth, the role of the economic profession is examined. Finally, the discussion is summarized. 2 THE STATISTICAL PICTURE This section traces and compares the behavior of several key economic aggregates in Sweden and the United States. The year 1929 has been adopted as the basis for comparison as this was a year of fairly high economic activity and a low rate of unemployment in both countries.
Income and production
The depression started earlier, became deeper, and lasted longer in the United States than in Sweden. This is seen from the behavior of real income shown in figure 1 and table 1. Between 1929 and 1933, U.S. real income declined for four consecutive years by roughly one-third. In the same period Swedish real income was reduced by 10 percent. (It actually increased by 3 percent in 1929-30). Generally, 1929 is regarded as the beginning of the American depression. In Sweden, 1930, or more precisely the second half of 1930, is commonly designated as the start of the downturn. The recovery began at roughly the same time in the two countries, that is, in 1932-33, but it proceeded at a faster rate in the United States.
Nonetheless, the index of Swedish real income in 1937 was one-fifth larger than the American. Real income in the United States had not reached the level of 1929 by 1937. In Sweden the level of 1929 had already been surpassed by 1934.
Data on industrial production reveal roughly the same pattern as those on real income. Figure   1 and table 1 show the reduction in industrial production to be of a larger magnitude in the United States, where it declined by 46 percent between 1929 and 1932, than (table 2) . In Sweden the corresponding share of the gross domestic product displayed a considerably smaller reduction, nowhere near the size of the American decline. In the United States the share of consumption increased markedly as a consequence of the decline of investments. Table 2 reveals an important difference between the two economies. Exports and imports commanded about one-fifth of the Swedish domestic product prior to the depression, while the corresponding shares were much smaller for the United States -about 4 to 5 percent. The depression had an extremely strong impact on Swedish exports and imports. Exports declined in current prices from 2.7 billion kronor in 1929 to 1.2 billion in 1932 (Johansson 1968, pp. 151-52) . The share of exports in gross domestic product fell from 20 percent in 1929 to 13 percent in 1932 (table 2). In less than three years the demand for exports was practically halved -in some branches the decline was much stronger. The fall in exports was accompanied by a reduction in imports of roughly the same size.
The depression reduced the relative size of the Swedish export-import sector. Industries producing for the domestic market remained less affected than the export industries by the decline in the world economy (table 3) . The production of the export industries fell by onethird from 1929 to 1932. Industries selling products for domestic use experienced a 13 percent drop in these three years. Furthermore, the consumption goods industries fared better than industries producing investment goods.
Prices
The world price level had fallen secularly since the first half of the 1920s. This decline was accentuated during the depression. Those countries that left the gold standard early in the 1930s, however, were as a rule able to reduce the rate of deflation compared to the experience of those countries that remained on gold. Sweden went off gold almost at the same time as Great Britain in September 1931. After this step the Swedish consumer price index remained practically constant until the rise in world prices around 1937 (figure 2). This is one of the longest periods of price stability in Swedish history according to available statistics. The development of consumer prices fro 1931 to 1936 should be regarded primarily as the result of the monetary program of 1931, which aimed at stabilizing the domestic purchasing power of the Swedish krona. American consumer prices, however, continued to fall until the dollar went off gold in 1933. By then, U.S. consumer prices were 25 percent below the level of 1929, while the corresponding figure for Sweden is only 8 percent (table 4) .
Wholesale prices fell more than consumer prices, particularly in Sweden (table 4). The decline was of almost the same size and had nearly the same timing in the two countries. This pattern was due to the world deflation, which affected prices of internationally traded raw materials more strongly than those of domestically produced and consumed goods. (The wholesale price indices included a larger fraction of the first-mentioned type of goods than did the consumer price indices). The sharper fall of U.S. prices is also seen in the behavior of the implicit deflator of the American gross domestic product. It declined by one-fourth from 1929 to 1933 (table 4). The deflator of the Swedish domestic product exhibited a reduction of 16 percent within the same period.
Monetary aggregates
There are significant differences between the Swedish and American monetary experiences.
The contrast between the sharp reduction in the American money stock and the constancy of the Swedish volume of money in the period 1929-33 is a striking feature of table 5 (see also figure 1). The American money stock (M 2 ) declined by about one-third while the Swedish (M 2 ) actually increased by a few percentage points in these years. The absolute level of the American money stock fell successively between February 1929 and April 1933, shown in table 6. The growth rate of the Swedish money stock was negative between July 1930 and January 1932 -a much shorter period than in the United States. The contraction phase prior to the trough of 1931 in the specific growth cycle of the money stock was considerably longer in the United States than in Sweden (col. [1] in table 6). The expansion phases of the two countries, however, were of roughly the same length.
A breakdown of the growth rate of the money stock with the purpose of discerning the contributions of its proximate determinants -the monetary base, the currency-money ratio and the reserve-deposit ratio -reveals the following pattern. The U.S. currency ratio accounted for a larger average absolute contribution to the growth of the money stock than its Swedish counterpart. This may be seen from column (4) The U.S. reserve ratio also increased in the 1930s. Runs and bank failures, forcing banks still in existence to increase their holdings of reserves, were a major factor behind this change.
The continuous rise of this ratio after 1933 has been regarded as the result of a buildup of desired reserves in response to the bank runs and the inadequate support provided by the Federal Reserve System during the panics.
In both countries the monetary base expanded during the years 1930-36 -that is, even during the trough of 1931. This pattern is explained to a large extent by a sharp rise in the demand for cash in the form of notes. The liquidity crises occurring in several countries took the form of massive conversions of bank deposits to notes. In both Sweden and the United States the expansion of the total amount of base money after 1933 was closely linked to the rise in the volume of base-money reserves held by the commercial banking systems.
The annual percentage fluctuations of the income velocity of money (M 2 ) in Sweden and the United States during the depression were as a rule of the same sign as the changes in the money stock -that is, movements in velocity were not offsetting fluctuations in the money stock. Velocity declined markedly during the first years of the 1930s -in Sweden, between 1930 and 1933 , and in the United States, between 1930 and 1932 . The annual percentage changes in velocity were considerably larger than the movements in the money stock for several of the depression years.
Summary
The depression of the 1930s had an immense impact on the Swedish and American economies. In both countries real income, industrial production, employment, and prices declined sharply. There are considerable differences in the patterns of economic change. The depression was deeper and longer-lasting in the United States. The American monetary sector was the subject of greater disturbances, judging from the decline in the American money stock, the sharp increases in the currency ratio, and the spread of banking panics and bank failures. In Sweden the foreign sector was affected more strongly than other sectors of the economy.
Americans have termed the early years of the 1930s in their history Great Depression -no previous downturn in American economic activity has been as extensive. In Sweden, however, these years have not acquired a name of similar connotations. Actually, the postwar depression in the early 1920s was more severe than the recession of the 1930s as measured by the decline in real income, employment, prices, and the money stock 5 . The depression of 1920-23 was primarily caused by the policy of restoring the prewar gold parity of the Swedish currency after the monetary expansion and inflation of World War I. A strong deflation, produced by a contractionary monetary policy, accomplished a return to gold at the old parity of the krona. Thus, the Swedish depression at that time was basically the outcome of political decisions and generated by domestic policy measures -as opposed to the downtown of 1931-33, which was strongly influenced by foreign developments. 5 The Swedish money stock was reduced by 29 percent and the implicit deflator of the gross domestic product by 35 percent between 1920 and 1925.
THE CASE OF SWEDEN
The causes of the depression
The Swedish recession was caused by foreign developments, that is, by the worldwide depression of the international economy, transmitted to Sweden through the foreign sectorspecifically, by the large reduction in the demand for Swedish exports. The world depression did not influence the Swedish economy to any noticeable extent until the summer and fall of These two events had a minor impact, however, compared to the effects of international developments. 7
The conduct of monetary policy
The Swedish economy was fairly unaffected by the depression prior to the summer of 1930.
The Riksbank lowered the discount rate in 1930 in four steps, in order to follow the changes 7 What follows builds upon and summarizes the analysis of Swedish monetary and fiscal policy in the 1930s in Jonung (1979b 10 In his report to the Riksbank in 1931, Gustav Cassel urged the bank to rediscount and lend to the commercial banking system on liberal terms. He also advised the bank to supply as many notes as demanded by the public and to announce that any increase in the demand for notes would be satisfied. See Jonung (1979a) . parliament took quick action and arranged for a large loan to the bank. This loan, combined with other forms of lending to the banking system, contributed to financial stability and to a reduction of the impact of the Kreuger crash on the Swedish economy. Actually, the depreciation of the krona following Kreuger's death counteracted the deflationary forces.
Once the demand for foreign reserves by the Kreuger enterprises disappeared, the Riksbank was free to carry out a more expansionary policy than it had previously.
In the spring of 1932, as the depression became more severe in Sweden, the parliament In the summer of 1933 the Riksbank decided on its own initiative to peg the krona to the pound at the rate of 19:40, representing a depreciation relative to the gold parity of 18:15.
The bank maintained this rate for the rest of the 1930s. The recovery from the depression was well under way when the pound rate was pegged. The volume of Swedish exports rose steadily, and the surpluses in the balance of payments gave rise to a huge inflow of reserves.
The minutes of the board of the Riksbank of the mid-1930s reveal that the major problem for the bank was to find suitable investments for its foreign reserves.
The effects of the policy of the Riksbank
The policy of the Riksbank after the introduction of the paper standard in the fall of 1931 kept the Swedish money stock on practically the same level for five years until the boom of 1937 (figure 2). The monetary program of price stabilization was followed in the sense that the consumer price index of the bank was kept stable in these years. The monetary program was an effective restriction on the actions of the bank, preventing the bank from carrying out a deflationary policy aimed at tying the krona to the pound or to gold at the parity rate.
Attempts in this direction were actually made (Jonung 1979b Several explanations of the American depression have been proposed. The differences between them generally concern the weights assigned to monetary and non monetary factors in the causal interpretation. The recent American discussion has focused on two competing hypotheses, "the money hypothesis" and "the spending hypothesis", following the terminology proposed by Peter Temin (1976, p. 7) . The money hypothesis ascribes a central policy role to monetary policy and monetary events. The spending hypothesis attaches great weight to an exogenous shift in autonomous expenditures. Both of these explanations suggest that the Great Depression was generated by forces essentially working within the U.S. economy, implying that the depression spread from America to the rest of the world.
The basic elements of the two hypotheses can be expressed in the following way. The money hypothesis states, asserting the relative stability of the money-demand function, that a reduction in the supply of money caused the decline in real income and prices; that is, changes in the growth rate of the supply of money were a driving force behind the depression. An The Swedish money stock was held at roughly a constant level after Sweden had left the gold standard and depreciated its currency. The monetary program of domestic price stability forced the central bank to maintain a policy of a stable money stock. This policy undoubtedly was the major factor explaining why the depression in Sweden was shorter and milder than in the United States. During the 1920s, when the decline in the Swedish money stock was stronger than in the 1930s, domestic prices and economic activity fell more than in the 1930s.
Consequently, the Swedish case supports the view that an alternative monetary policy would have reduced the decline in US nominal income.
Swedish monetary policy was more expansionary than its American counterpart in the early 1930s, judging from the growth pattern money stock (figure 1). Still, Swedish monetary policy could have been more expansionary in these years -as some economists also requested -allowing for a more rapid monetary growth. Conceivably, such a policy would have been more effective in checking the Swedish contraction. Furthermore, Swedish monetary policy affected primarily the domestic price level and the output of domestic goods and services. Industries producing for domestic market fared better than the export industries (table 3) . As the American economy was more closed than the Swedish economy, an expansionary monetary policy would have influenced a larger share of the economy in the United States than in Sweden. The Swedish monetary authorities were faced with the task of offsetting the disappearance of the foreign demand for the export industries. This was less of a problem in the United States.
There is a major difference between the behavior of the Swedish and American central banks 
The spending hypothesis
There are several versions of the spending hypothesis, depending on which type of autonomous expenditure is postulated to have initiated the decline in aggregate demand. In the present discussion, Peter Temin's argument (1976) that a large and unexplained fall in U.S. consumption in 1930 caused the depression has attracted much debate. 13 According to 13 Temin's conclusion is based on a number of econometric tests of consumption functions for the United States in the interwar period. Mayer (1978) reports econometric results that are critical of Temin's arguments.
him, the reduction in consumption set off a multiplier process, reducing aggregated demand and national income. Essentially, the contraction of the succeeding years appears to be the result of the behavior of autonomous spending in 1930. In the analysis of the monetary sector, Temin suggests that the decline in income produced a downward shift in the demandfor-money schedule and thus an excess supply of money. The banking panics during the early stages of the depression are assigned a minor role:
There is no evidence that the banking panic of 1930 had a deflationary effect on the economy. Instead, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that the demand for money was falling more rapidly than the supply during 1930 and the first three- It is tempting to conclude that exactly the opposite situation prevailed in Sweden. The Swedish economists presented policymakers and public opinion with a thorough and, ex post, surprisingly correct analysis as well as reasonable policy recommendations. The political parties, the government, and the Riksbank bank were also ready to listen to the advice of the economists.
In order to understand the strong influence exercised by the economists as a professional group in the 1930s, one has to go back to the economic events in Sweden during and after When the money stock was held at stable level, domestic prices remained constant and the downturn in industrial production was smaller and of shorter duration than in the economy , with a sharply falling supply of money.
The Then Cassel examines various explanations of the U.S depression, like (1) underconsumption,
(2) excessive consumption, (3) overproduction, and (4) stock speculation. He dismisses all these hypotheses, arguing that it is
Perfectly clear that the course of economic events in the United States is essentially a pure process of deflation, quite distinct from ordinary economic movements, a process which began on a small scale as far back as 1929, and which has afterwards developed with such momentum that it is grinding to pieces the entire national economy.
This process of deflation was started by the Federal Reserve System in the spring of 1928, when, fearing stock-exchange speculation, it introduced restrictions on credits. The restrictive policy caused a pronounced fall in commodity prices in the United States. They had fallen from 95 by June 1929 to 64 by June 1932. "This very marked and continuous fall of prices cannot possibly be interpreted as a result of preceding economic, non monetary disturbances."
The fall in prices triggered a chain of events that aggravated the crisis. Various institutional developments contributed to this. The " prevalent views that the member banks ought not to be indebted to the Federal Reserve banks" prevented the Federal Reserve System from a policy of liberal lending that would have counteracted the deflationary process. Due to the absence of big banks with many branch offices, small banks were left on their own to face bank runs with no resort to central support from large banks. Big banks, on the other hand, tried to improve their reserve positions. They cut down their loans and contributed further to deflation.
The process of deflation "could have been checked only by a determined policy of antideflation on the part of the Federal Reserve banks" and by an active intervention extending the "effective supply of means of payment." Such a policy was not implemented because of the system's "almost superstitious dread of anything that could be stamped as inflation. " Furthermore, the Federal Reserve banks were hampered in their actions by the legal framework, specifically, by the restrictions eliminated by the Glass-Steagall Bill of February 1932 and by the amendment of the Federal Reserve Act of July 1932.
To sum up, Cassel is advocating a strong monetary interpretation, stating that (1) the U.S. depression was caused by monetary factors, and (2) an expansionary monetary policy could have effectively checked the depression. It is worth noting that Cassel was writing this in the midst of the crises and that he was observing American economic events from Sweden. In his later writings he remained a staunch proponent of a monetary view of the depression. He became extremely critical of the fiscal activism of the Stockholm School and of the work of Keynes and his followers.
